Destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities was a significant military accomplishment. But was it a significant strategic accomplishment? That is a very different question.
The principal justification for going to war was the danger that Iran might develop a nuclear weapon. If destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities permanently eliminated that possibility, the military action could be viewed as an extraordinary success. But if it merely delayed Iran’s ability to develop a weapon, the gain is considerably less impressive.
Bombs can destroy buildings, equipment and centrifuges. They cannot destroy scientific knowledge. Iran has spent decades developing the people and expertise necessary to operate a nuclear program. Its scientists and engineers know how to enrich uranium, manufacture centrifuges and develop the technology necessary for a nuclear fuel cycle. That knowledge survived the destruction of the facilities.
Nor does Iran necessarily have to rebuild the facilities that were destroyed. It could construct new facilities in different locations, potentially smaller and more difficult to detect. It could move equipment and personnel. And we cannot be certain that everything necessary to its nuclear program was destroyed in the first place. Some nuclear materials and equipment were not fully accounted for after the attacks.
This raises an important question: What exactly did we accomplish by destroying the facilities?
We undoubtedly set Iran’s nuclear program back. But setting it back is not the same as ending it. We may have bought time, perhaps even several years. But unless that time produces a permanent solution, the underlying problem remains.
There is another reason the destruction of the facilities may not be as significant as it first appears: Iran is not the only country in the world with nuclear knowledge and technology.
North Korea already possesses nuclear weapons. We have no evidence that North Korea would provide Iran with a nuclear weapon, and it would be wrong to suggest that such a transfer is inevitable. But the possibility demonstrates the limits of our military victory. If Iran ultimately decided that possessing a nuclear weapon was essential to its security, it would not necessarily have to reconstruct everything we destroyed. It could potentially seek technology, expertise or other assistance from another country.
And there is an even more troubling possibility: the war itself may have strengthened Iran’s determination to obtain a nuclear weapon.
Iranian leaders can now look at what happened and draw a simple lesson: We were attacked even though we did not possess a nuclear weapon. Perhaps we would not have been attacked if we had possessed one.
That is essentially the security argument behind nuclear deterrence. A nuclear weapon is not necessarily viewed by its possessor as a weapon to be used. It can be viewed as an insurance policy against being attacked.
If that is the lesson Iran takes from this war, then we may have accomplished something very different from what we intended. We may have delayed Iran’s nuclear program while simultaneously giving Iranian leaders a greater incentive to complete it.
So, what did the destruction of Iran’s nuclear facilities actually accomplish?
We damaged the facilities. We disrupted Iran’s nuclear program. And we probably delayed its ability to produce a nuclear weapon.
Those are genuine accomplishments. But they fall considerably short of the ultimate objective: guaranteeing that Iran will never possess a nuclear weapon.
We destroyed facilities. We did not destroy the knowledge, the capability or necessarily the determination to rebuild.
The gain, therefore, may be best described in two words:
We bought time.
The important question is how much time we bought—and what Iran will do with it.
Those questions will be important when we consider the other side of the ledger. In our next article, we will examine the pain—the human, economic, military and geopolitical costs of the war.
Only then will we be able to decide whether the gain was worth the pain.
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